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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
t

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

i

DEAN KEITH HICKMAN,

t

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 880362

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of a first degree
felony in the Third District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(h)(1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant should have been allowed to

withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the trial court
failed to establish a factual basis for aggravated robbery where
the court explained the facts to defendant at the time he entered
his plea.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1953):
Attempt-Elements of offense.
(1) For purposes of this part a person is
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime, if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the offense,
he engages in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward commission of the
offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct
does not constitute a substantial step unless

it is strongly corroborative of the actor's
intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt
shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was
actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal
impossibility if the offense could have been
committed had the attendant circumstances
been as the actor believed them to be.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301 (1953):
Robbery.
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and
intentional taking of personal property in
the possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second
degree.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1953):
Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery
if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a
deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the
first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act
shall be deemed to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of,
or in the immediate flight after the attempt
or commission of a robbery.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with attempted first degree
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S
76-5-202 (1978); aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-203 (1978); and aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S

-2-

76-6-302 (1978) (R. 14-15).

On January 18, 1985, defendant

appeared before Judge Scott Daniels in the Third District Court
and pled guilty to aggravated robbery pursuant to a plea bargain
agreement that, inter alia, dismissed the other two counts (R.
238).
Defendant, who waived his right to be sentenced at a
later date and did not wish to have a presentence report,
requested immediate sentencing (R. 238 at 9).

Judge Daniels

sentenced defendant to a term of five years to life in the Utah
State Prison (R. 238 at 9-10).
Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea on July 6,
1988 (R. 186-223).
1988 (R. 114-15).

Judge Daniels denied the motion on August 11,
Defendant appeals from the denial of that

motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts are contained in the Statement of
the Case above and in the Argument portion of this brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's guilty plea was voluntary, knowing and
intelligent because Judge Daniels described to defendant the
factual bases of the plea required to establish the elements of
aggravated robbery.

Defendant's belated claim that no property

was taken does not invalidate his plea where he expressly
admitted to taking property on the record.

The record as a whole

All record references are to the transcripts and pleadings
contained in companion case number 880305.
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also establishes that defendant was not threatened or promised
anything to induce his plea.

For these reasons, Judge Daniels

did not abuse his discretion in refusing to allow defendant to
withdraw his plea.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY AND
INTELLIGENTLY PLED GUILTY AND THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY DENIED HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
PLEA.
Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea claiming
that it was unknowing, involuntary and unintelligent and taken in
violation of Rule 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Rule
3.6 of the Rules of Practice in District Courts.

Specifically,

defendant asserted that Judge Daniels did not establish a factual
basis for his plea to aggravated robbery.

A review of the

transcript of the arraignment reveals that defendant's claim is
meritless.
Initially, it should be noted that this Court will not
overturn an order denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
unless it is a clear abuse of discretion.
747 P.2d 422 (Utah 1987).

This is especially true where the plea

is the result of plea bargaining.
(Utah 1977).

State v. Mildenhall,

State v» Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248

Judge Daniels did not abuse his discretion in

denying defendant's motion because he did advise defendant of the
fact8 in relation to the elements of aggravated robbery.
During the arraignment the following occurred;
THE COURT: Let me — I want you to
understand what the elements of the offense
are, make sure you know what they'd have to
prove.
-4-

They would have to prove that in Salt
Lake County at about 965 South 2200 East, on
or about November 1st, 1984, you unlawfully
and intentionally took personal property in
possession of A. W. Kelson or from his
immediate person by threatening with some
sort of a deadly weapon. They'd have to
prove it was in Salt Lake County. They'd
have to prove the date, prove you did it to
A. W. Kelson. All those things they have to
prove, all the elements that are read. Do
you understand that?
MR. HICKMAN:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Is the
reason that you are pleading guilty of this
charge because you are guilty of it?
MR. HICKMAN:

Yes, sir.

(R. 238 at 6-7). This passage clearly contained a sufficient
factual basis for a conviction of aggravated robbery which is
defined in Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-301 and -302 (1978) as "the
unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in the
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence,
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear" by use
of a "deadly weapon."
Defendant more specifically alleges that he could not
have been found guilty of aggravated robbery because no property
was actually taken and that he should not have been allowed to
plead guilty (App. Brief at 12). Because defendant pled guilty
after Judge Daniels explained to him that an element of the
offense was the taking of property, said that he understood the
elements and said he was pleading guilty because he was guilty,
(see R. 238 at 7), he should not now be heard to complain that
the facts as described by the trial court are not the actual
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facts of the case.

United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718-19

(2nd Cir. 1965), cert, denied 382 U.S. 843 (1965)(guilty plea
waives all nonjurisdictional claims); c.f > State v* Beck, 584
P.2d 870 (Utah 1978)(guilty plea waives right to appeal lack of
jury trial) and State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977)(guilty
plea waives claim of lack of probable cause for arrest warrant).
Even if this Court does review the merits of
defendant's claim that the facts do not support his conviction/
defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea.

Section 76-6-

302(3) provides that a person is guilty of aggravated robbery if
in the course of an attempt to commit robbery he uses a deadly
weapon.

Thus, the completed offense of aggravated robbery does

not require that property actually be taken only that the actor
intentionally engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of a robbery using a deadly weapon.

See Utah

Code Ann. S 76-4-101 (1978)(attempt defined)(quoted above at 1).
Defendant also claims that Judge Daniels erred in
failing to determine that his plea was not the result of threats
or other inducements (App. Brief at 5).

Judge Daniels did not

expressly rule on this issue, however, defendant's motion to
withdraw does contain a reference to the Rule 11 requirement that
the judge determine that his plea was not the result of threats
or promises (R. 191). Thus, Judge Daniels implicitly ruled that
the issue did not support withdrawal of the plea.
While it is true that Judge Daniels did not
specifically ask defendant at the time of his plea if he had been
threatened or otherwise induced to plead guilty, the
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circumstances as a whole support Judge Daniels' finding that the
plea was voluntary.

See Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah

1985), and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985).

Judge

Daniels received a full explanation of the plea agreement in open
court (R. 238 at 2-3). He also established that defendant pled
guilty because he was guilty (R. 238 at 7); leading to a logical
inference that defendant was not pleading guilty due to threats
or inducements.

Finally, defendant executed an affidavit in open

court that specifically states that "[n]o promises or threats of
any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty." (R. 21).
Defendant cites State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987) for the proposition that the trial judge was required to
question defendant on the record about promises or threats.
Gibbons was decided three years after defendant pled guilty.
Prior to Gibbons, this Court had always applied the Brooks-Warner
record as a whole test.

This Court should adopt the position

taken by the Court of Appeals in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d
92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), rehearing denied, 91 Utah Adv. Rep. 17
(1988), cert, denied 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988); that Gibbons
represents a clear break with the past in application of a
procedural rule and that it will not be retroactively applied.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm the decision of the lower court and deny defendant's
request to withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 3t?d

day of March, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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